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I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly sixty years, India, through a policy called "reservations," has
attempted to put an end to its ancient caste system by using quotas and other
benefits to ensure that historically disadvantaged groups have political voice,
access to education, and opportunities for state employment. The legal
doctrine developed alongside this policy traces the national memory of the
caste system and its consequences, and reflects an understanding that the caste
system has left a pervasive mark on nearly every aspect of Indian society.
The doctrines developed by courts in response to these policies,
however, have a peculiar relationship to the political authority of castes and
other communities subordinate to the state. To a surprising extent, Indian
courts have shown deference to the authority of the caste system in ways that
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underscore the political authority of the caste hierarchy and undermine the
constitution's aspiration to greater equality. This feature of Indian equality
law reflects a tension between the constitutional aspiration to social reform on
the one hand, and deference to the authority of the caste or tribe to define its
own boundaries on the other.
Indian law has sought to include these communities in its project of far-
reaching social reform. When constitutional law attempts to dismantle a status
hierarchy and articulate a normative framework for doing so, it must
contemplate this process of reform as involving not only the enactment of
legal rules to protect these groups, but also the important role these groups
will play in the evolution of the normative commitments that structure law's
relationship to that hierarchy. The castes themselves have a view of Indian
history that has been shaped by their history of social subordination. Indian
constitutional law has sought to break with that history and to articulate new
constitutional values that mark the beginning of a new social order.
These exchanges between subordinated groups and the law look peculiar
to U.S. eyes. They can, however, help U.S. jurists understand components of
U.S. law so engrained that they are often overlooked. By providing a detailed
account of the Indian doctrine relating to the reservation policy and
membership rules within the caste system, this Note aspires to uncover part of
the theory through which Indian doctrine negotiates the relationship between
law and the social authority lodged in the caste community. I
By considering the relationship between law and the caste system in
Indian equality law, this Note argues that U.S. law has too often seen
subordinate groups as the object of legal reform without appreciating the ways
that they exert normative authority and the notion that they, too, envision a
relationship with the broader social order. The common norms of these
communities emerge from deeply rooted social arrangements and typically
involve more fundamental social and political commitments.
The contrast between India and the United States illustrates the
relationship between legal doctrine and the subordinate groups, and between
their experience and shared cultural understandings. U.S. law conceives of
these groups as the subject of protection, but it does not seek to engage them
in a shared project that would collectively remake the basic normative
commitments of the polity. Racial minorities, women, and other protected
groups are thus not invited to participate in ongoing efforts to shape our
constitutional commitments. U.S. law does not envision racial minorities or
women as part of a community that could provide a separate and important
source of constitutional values that challenge and respond to those of the rest
of the society. Our law's conception of these communities as the object of
protection, rather than as allies in reform, marks the basic difference between
Indian and U.S. equality law.
1. See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of
Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295 (2007); Frank 1. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage:
Race and Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United States and South Africa, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 1378, 1396-1418 (2004) (exploring the relationship between constitutional law and constitutional
culture in South Africa and the United States).
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This Note investigates the tension between the Indian Constitution's
aspiration to repudiate the past practices of the caste system and the forms of
normative authority that continue to be exerted by these communities. It
argues that Indian courts recognize the authority of caste communities to
define their own terms of membership at the same time that they seek to
eradicate them, because they understand that they must invite caste
communities to participate in efforts to dismantle a status hierarchy if they are
to be successful. Incursions by constitutional law into a social order with deep
roots and powerful authority require that the communities themselves
participate in the process of undoing centuries of oppression. Indian courts
have come to understand that it is not possible to remake the social order in
the image of the aspirations articulated in the constitution without engaging
subordinate communities in the process of reform.
This Note approaches Indian constitutional law on the caste system from
a different perspective than existing scholarship in this field.2 A number of
scholars have evaluated the effectiveness of the reservation policy in India as
compared to affirmative action in the United States.3 This Note, however,
does not centrally aim to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of the
reservation policy or weigh the arguments for its justification.4 Although some
of the observations about the efficacy of the legal doctrine in the Note will
bear on the evaluation of the effectiveness of the doctrines the Indian Supreme
Court has developed, these considerations are not the main thrust of the
argument. Instead, this Note provides an account of Indian constitutional law
on the reservation policy and attempts to explain the theoretical assumptions
that lie beneath the tension between its assertion of national authority and its
deference to the practices of local communities. Through a study of the Indian
cases, this Note seeks to contribute to the growing literature on comparative
constitutionalism by providing an account of the tensions within Indian
equality law that emerge from the interaction between constitutional law and
caste communities.
5
2. Significant studies of Indian constitutionalism in comparative perspective include
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION (1966); S.C. DASH, THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1968); and SARBANI SEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATIONS (2007). A recent and important
contribution to the literature on Indian constitutional law and comparative secularism is GARY JEFFREY
JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA'S SECULARISM IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
(2003).
3. There have been several efforts to compare affirmative action in the United States and the
reservation policy in India, which have tended to focus on the mechanics and effectiveness of each
system. See, e.g., SUNITA PARIKH, THE POLITICS OF PREFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA (2000); see also Clark D. Cunningham & N.R.
Madhava Menon, Race, Class, Caste... ? Rethinking Affirmative Action, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1296, 1302-
07 (1999) (arguing that Indian jurisprudence has gone beyond U.S. law in accounting for the underlying
social dimensions of caste).
4. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Pursuing Equality: An Assessment of India's Policy of
Compensatory Discrimination for Disadvantaged Groups, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
INDIA: A REASSESSMENT 129 (Dilip K. Basu & Richard Sisson eds., 1986).
5. See, e.g., VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d
ed. 2006); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do (2001); ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of
World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 794 (1997) ("Comparative constitutional law is in its
infancy."); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional
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Existing scholarship on the reservation policy and its surrounding legal
regime gives scant attention to the strategies through which constitutional law
navigates the authority of caste communities. Among the few studies of the
reservation policy in India, the most exhaustive is Marc Galanter's 1984 book
Competing Equalities, which offers a detailed description of the reservation
policy and attempts to evaluate its overall effectiveness as a program of social
reform.6 The book focuses on the general outlines of constitutional doctrine,
such as caste quotas and the ways in which these benefits are assigned to
particular groups. 7 Galanter gives some attention to the expulsion and
readmission of members of castes and tribes, but he does not focus on the
specific doctrinal and theoretical questions that are the subject of this Note.
Laura Dudley Jenkins's 2003 study Identity and Classification in India:
Defining the Disadvantaged, explores the basic tension at the heart of the
reservation policy: the effort to eradicate caste while at the same time giving it
a permanent legal significance. 8 Jenkins, a political scientist, offers a great
deal of insight about the specific ways that the Indian state implements the
reservation policy. The book asks what the Indian case can offer as an
example of an effort to deconstruct a social hierarchy by reinforcing it, and the
questions at the heart of its argument are guided by social and postcolonial
theory. 9 Jenkins examines state practice with a wide lens, as her focus is not
only on constitutional law. On the other hand, Jenkins devotes only one
chapter to the legal doctrine of the reservation policy.' 0 Since her primary
interest is the role of identity within India's state-driven efforts at social
reform, Jenkins examines cases in which courts were asked to determine
whether a person was entitled to caste membership.1' Jenkins does not place
these cases in a broader discussion of the constitutional doctrine on the
reservation policy, and does not explain how these aspects of the doctrine
might rest on a particular conception of social order that shapes constitutional
doctrine.
In contrast to these scholars, this Note attempts to understand a different
puzzle: why Indian law recognizes caste communities and underscores their
authority while it seeks to put an end to caste subordination. This tension in
the Indian jurisprudence of caste marks a striking contrast to the way that U.S.
law has conceptualized the social order. As Indian courts have appreciated,
legal reform of entrenched social structures can only be achieved through
complicated dialogues between legal doctrine and normative commitments, as
well as cultural affiliations that exist in the communities that Indian law hopes
to save from centuries of oppression.
Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 254-63 (2001); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1228-30 (1999).
6. MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA
(1984).
7. See id. at 121-47.
8. LAURA DUDLEY JENKINS, IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION IN INDIA: DEFINING THE
DISADVANTAGED (2003).
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. at 27-41.
11. Id.
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This Note proceeds in four stages. Part II offers an account of the
operation of the modem caste system and the history of the reservation policy
enacted by the Indian Constitution. Part III examines the narratives developed
by courts to explain the history of the caste system and to reconcile the
reservation policy with an aspiration of eradicating the injustices of the caste
system and achieving a deeper and more lasting form of equality.
Part IV turns to the tension between deference to local authority and
national objectives of constitutional reform, and describes this tension as a
reflection of the Indian Supreme Court's understanding that the caste system
is intertwined with the structure of Indian society in ways that make such
deference necessary to achieve the objective of social reform. This Part
examines several theorists, and draws from the work of Robert Cover and
others to understand the relationship between the law and the social order that
is envisioned by these cases.
Part V examines the ways that Indian law's theorization of the authority
of caste communities might bear on U.S. antidiscrimination law. It speculates
that U.S. law might be more successful at its project of achieving a more just
social order, if it were more attuned to the way that subordinate communities
are centrally involved in the process of social reform.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE CASTE SYSTEM AND RESERVATION POLICY
A. The History and Structure of the Caste System
Although scholars continue to debate the precise origins of the caste
system, there is general agreement among historians and anthropologists that
it has existed in India for as long as two thousand years. 12 The ancient Hindu
scriptures, the Veda, describe a strict social hierarchy that bears some
resemblance to the modem Indian caste system. 13 According to the Veda, the
universe is organized into a strict classification scheme and a set of
hierarchical relationships that are reflected in the organization of society.
14
The relationship between the caste system and the structure of the universe
provided a deep religious justification for the stratification of society
according to caste, and its compartmentalization into sovereign communities
with the power to govern their own affairs.'
5
The caste system divides society into discrete groups that are
traditionally associated with a certain profession and that strongly prohibit
marriage outside of the caste. 16 These groups exist in a hierarchical
relationship to one another, and a person born into a caste remains within it
12. OLIVER MENDELSOHN & MARIKA VICzLANY, THE UNTOUCHABLES 7 (1998) ("[W]hy the
vama system or Untouchability developed in India is far from clear, but perhaps it had something to do
with the incursion of 'Aryans' who migrated from Europe and established themselves in India."); I
ROMILA THAPAR, A HISTORY OF INDIA 48-49 (2d ed. 1990).
13. BRIAN K. SMITH, CLASSIFYING THE UNIVERSE: THE ANCIENT INDIAN VARNA SYSTEM AND
THE ORIGINS OF CASTE 46-47 (1994); see also LOuiS DUMONT, HOMO HIERARCHICUS: THE CASTE
SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 65-89 (1970).
14. SMITH, supra note 13, at 49.
15. Id.
16. DUMONT, supra note 13, at 92-112.
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unless he or she is expelled from it. 17 By tradition, moving from one caste to
another was extremely difficult if not impossible; the caste identity that one
received at birth could not typically be altered by any means. 18 The caste
groups commonly known as "untouchables" are at the very bottom of the
caste system and have traditionally been subject to discrimination and severe
forms of oppression by the higher castes. 19 The relationships among the
castes, especially between higher castes and the untouchables, frequently take
the form of physical distance. 20 The caste hierarchy is founded on the belief
that the lower castes can pollute the higher castes, and the fear that members
of the higher castes who have contact with the lower castes will be spiritually
damaged.
Today, caste remains a major feature of village life throughout India.22
Drawing on fieldwork in several North Indian villages conducted in 2002, for
example, the sociologist Anirudh Krishna concluded that "[c]aste continues to
be a primary source of social identity in these villages." 23 Indeed, "people live
in caste-specific neighborhoods," and even "the clothes that they wear reveal
their caste identity." 24 Some scholars point to changing features of the caste
system, such as the decline of some of its religious features and the decreasing
number of seats in Congress occupied by members of the higher castes, but
they concede that, especially in rural areas, caste remains a striking and
fundamental aspect of life in many regions of the country.
25
In addition to establishing a firm social hierarchy, the caste system also
involves a complicated distribution of political authority among the various
communities that comprise the Hindu social structure. In some areas, castes
are governed by a panchayat, an assembly usually composed of a small
number of representatives who promulgate legal standards to govern the caste,
and who resolve internal disputes relating to excommunication, intermarriage,
and other matters pertaining to the community.26 On occasion, a panchayat
will consist of several members of other groups that are similarly situated in
society. Each group sends one or two elder members to one panchayat, which
then exerts authority over these subordinate groups. Typically, however, a
17. GALANTER, supra note 6, at 8.
18. Id.
19. See MENDELSOHN & VICZIANY, supra note 12, at 5-20.
20. Id. at 12-13.
21. GALANTER, supra note 6, at 14.
22. Dennis B. McGilvray, Paraiyar Drummers of Sri Lanka: Consensus and Constraint in an
Untouchable Caste, 10 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 97 (1983) (arguing that upper castes and lower castes
continue to agree about the ideological underpinnings of the caste system); Ashutosh Varshney, Is India
Becoming More Democratic?, 59 J. ASIAN STUD. 3 (2000) (arguing that politics in South India is
increasingly caste-based).
23. Anirudh Krishna, What Is Happening to Caste?: A View from Some North Indian Villages,
62 J. ASIAN STUD. 1171, 1190 (2003).
24. Id.
25. Craig Jeffrey, 'A Fist is Stronger than Five Fingers ': Caste and Dominance in Rural
North India, 26 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 217, 218 (2001) ("(W]hile caste as a
religiously sanctioned system of resource transfer is declining in importance in India, caste remains a
powerful political identity and form of symbolic and social capital.").
26. George Mathew & Ramesh C. Nayak, Panchayats at Work: What It Means for the
Oppressed?, 31 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1765, 1765-68 (1996).
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panchayat is comprised of members of the same caste who are all situated in a
particular community.
27
In its present form, the caste system does not establish merely a
hierarchy of groups in society, but also a system of political authority with
formal terms of membership. One's particular caste is a form of identity, and
also an affiliation to a community-with some elements of sovereignty-that
has limited authority to establish its own system of governance.
28
B. Caste and the Indian Constitution
When India achieved independence in 1947, one of the first tasks taken
up by the Constituent Assembly was dissolution of the caste system. 29 The
Congress Party, led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, had become
captivated by the ideology of an emergent Indian nationalism which,
influenced by Western socialist thinkers and Congress Party members' own
reactions to devastating inequalities present in India society, rested upon a
profound commitment to social reform. Since the early nineteenth century,
Hindu nationalist thinkers had been interested in the historical consequences
of the caste system, and believed that eradicating the caste system would be
the first step toward establishing a new government in India and ensuring that
the country would be able to compete with other modem nations.
30
During the Constituent Assembly debates, Granville Austin has argued,
the delegates believed that "[t]he Constitution was to foster the achievement
of many goals. Transcendent among them was that of social revolution.
Through this revolution would be fulfilled the basic needs of the common
man, and, it was hoped, this revolution would bring about fundamental
changes in the structure of Indian society .... Looking to U.K. and U.S.
examples, the delegates at the Constituent Assembly determined that the
"negative" rights associated with these constitutional regimes would be
insufficient to combat the entrenched inequalities they witnessed.32 Instead of
the mere legal prohibition of discrimination and a commitment to "formal
equality," they sought a more aggressive commitment to social reform that
aimed to completely restructure society in pursuit of a complete abolition of
the ancient hierarchies that they saw pervading, and crippling, Indian
communities.
33
During the Constituent Assembly debates, the injustices perpetrated
under the caste system were one of the most pressing matters facing the
delegates. During an initial discussion of a resolution that would define the
fundamental "aims and objects" of the Assembly, Mr. M.R. Masani argued
27. For a description of the organization of a panchayat, see Robert M. Hayden,
Excommunication as Everyday Event and Ultimate Sanction: The Nature of Suspension from an Indian
Caste, 42 J. ASIAN STUD. 291, 294 (1983). See also MANOJ RAI ET AL., THE STATE OF THE PANCHAYATS:
A PARTICIPATORY PERSPECTIVE (2001); T.K. omrnmen, Rural Community Power Structure in India, 49
Soc. FORCES 226 (1970).
28. Hayden, supra note 27, at 294-96.
29. AUSTIN, supra note 2, at xvii-xviii.
30. CHARLES H. HEIMSATH, INDIAN NATIONALISM AND HINDu SOCIAL REFORM 309-52 (1964).
31. AUSTIN, supra note 2, at xvii.
32. Id. at 60.
33. Id.
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that the caste system had crippled India's political development and expressed
hope that the new constitution would allow historically oppressed lower castes
to have greater equality in the new polity:
I hope ... that these minorities which exist in our country, will, along with the majority,
continue their progress towards becoming a nation, a process which in this ancient
country was happening through the absorption of new groups that came into it through
the centuries, but a process which seems to have been retarded through the rigidity of
caste and through the exclusiveness of society in the past few centuries.
34
Masani argued that despite a history that included considerable immigration
and diversity, the possibilities for equality in India had been frustrated by the
burdens of caste membership.
Later in the debates, Dr. S. Radhakrishanan argued that India must have
a "socio-economic revolution" 35 that would result in "a fundamental alteration
in the structure of Indian society," and this would necessarily include the
complete dismantling of the caste system.36 While considering the merits of a
draft constitution, Kaka Bhagwant Roy expressed his hope that the new
constitution would help bring about the radical reorganization of society and,
in particular, that it would strike at the roots of the caste system. He offered a
vision of India's future that aspired to the elimination of caste and that would
be characterized by a deep engagement with the nation's history of severe
social inequality:
Now it is the duty of the people to consolidate this change and to infuse life by their good
actions in this Constitution which is based on beautiful ideas .... I would like to say that
those who called themselves of higher castes have perpetrated brutalities [on the
"Harijans," or untouchables] throughout the centuries. I cannot understand how those
who have praised India and Indians have done so? That country is very low and mean in
which discrimination has been made and is being made between man and man. For
centuries together the untouchables and the Harijans of India have been so badly down-
trodden that they cannot be compensated even if the reins of Indian Government are
handed over to them. In this age of progress a day will dawn when the future generations
will hang their heads in shame.
37
The new constitution, for Bhagwant Roy, and for many of the delegates,
would allow Indians finally to free themselves from an ancient history of
inequality and social oppression. Its guarantees would provide the beginning
of redemption. Over time, he prophesied, "that great revolution which lies
implicit in the Constitution and looks like a dream, will reveal itself in its true
color."
38
The final constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly in
November 1949 contains many powerful commitments to social reform and to
the abolition of existing social inequalities associated with the Hindu caste
system.39 Article 14 states that the "State shall not deny to any person equality
before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of
34. 1 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 91 (1949) [hereinafter DEBATES].
35. 2 DEBATES, supra note 34, at 273.
36. Id. at 269.
37. 11 DEBATES, supra note 34, at 892-93.
38. Id. at 892.
39. JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 7-8.
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India.",40 Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, race,
caste, sex, or place of birth.4' Article 17 abolishes untouchability and makes
"[t]he enforcement of any disability arising [from it] an offence punishable in
accordance with law.', 42 Additionally, Article 29 provides that "[a]ny section
of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a
distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve
the same.
' 4
The conception of equality that is at the center of this constitutional
structure is substantially broader than the basic guarantee of equality before
the law. Article 15(4) provides that "[n]othing in this article ... shall prevent
the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes." 44 The constitution contains many different
provisions that explicitly provide benefits to these groups. Articles 341 and
342 empower the President, with consultation of the governor of a particular
state, to identify the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes that will receive
benefits under the constitution. The Scheduled Tribes are indigenous
communities that had been, like the untouchables, the subject of historical
discrimination and treated in ways equivalent with untouchability. 45 Under the
constitution, therefore, the Scheduled Tribes are regarded as akin to lower
caste groups for the purposes of the benefits accorded by the constitution.
Article 330 reserves seats in the legislature for the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in proportion to the populations of these groups in each
46
state. Article 335 entitles Scheduled Castes and Tribes to receive special
consideration in hiring for government posts.
47
In his study of Indian secularism, Gary Jacobsohn has characterized the
model of social reform under the Indian Constitution as "ameliorative" in
orientation. 48 He argues that the constitution "seeks an amelioration of the
social conditions of people long burdened by the inequities of religiously
based hierarchies, but also embodies a vision of intergroup comity whose
fulfillment necessitates cautious deliberation in the pursuit of abstract
justice.",49 Jacobsohn understands the Indian Constitution's commitment to
abolishing caste distinctions as a part of its aspiration to create a secular and
modern society while at the same time avoiding conflicts among the castes,
among different religious groups in the society, and most importantly,
between Muslims and Hindus. 50 The constitution, for example, established a
"uniform civil code," in order to abolish Hindu law and establish a new
foundation for the legal system based on secular principles. 51 The
40. INDIA CONST. art. 14.
41. Id. art. 15.
42. Id. art. 17.
43. Id. art. 29.
44. Id. art. 15, § 4.
45. See GALANTER, supra note 6, at 147-53.
46. INDIA CONST. art. 330.
47. Id. art. 335.
48. JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 94.
49. Id.; see also id. at 120-21.
50. See id. at 120.
51. INDIA CONST. art. 44 ("The State shall endeavor to secure for the citizens a uniform civil
2010]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 35:199
constitution's aspiration to social reform, then, was grounded in a hope to
eliminate caste-based distinctions and create a secular society where the
nation's many diverse communities can fully participate in the new polity.
52
The commitment to social reform in the Indian Constitution has been
criticized by some commentators who see the constitution as neglecting large
segments of the population, and as reflecting a Hindu nationalist and anti-
Muslim bias. Because the reservation policy was aimed at abolishing the
Hindu caste system, and not other features of inequality in India, there has
been an ongoing debate in India about whether Muslims, who have also been
disadvantaged in some parts of the country, should have access to similar
benefits. 53 The relevance of this controversy for the jurisprudence on the
reservation policy is that the continuing insistence in the doctrine that the
caste system is a product of Hinduism results from a tense political
environment in India, because some non-Hindu groups are unable to obtain
benefits under the reservation program and some see this as an example of
discrimination against Muslims by the Hindu majority. This aspect of the
doctrine marks a significant limit to the aspirations of the constitution and the
reformist principles that express these commitments.54
On the whole, the Indian Constitution, as evidenced by its textual
provisions and the intentions of its ratifiers, contemplates a remarkable
departure from the past. The caste system imposed such structures on the daily
experiences of individuals, on their fundamental perspectives, and on their
judgments of others. On its face, therefore, the constitution's ambition to
remove these taints from Indian society and usher in new forms of freedom
was radical in scope, and deeply antagonistic to nonlegal forms of authority
throughout society.
III. CASTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION
The equality provisions of the new constitution-with their bold
assertion of a new standard of social equality-amounted to an aspiration that
the nation would break free from the structures and forms of discrimination
that had characterized India's past. The constitutional doctrine on the
reservation policy also engaged with the memory of past discrimination and
emphasized that the constitution would mark the establishment of a new
political order in which these ancient forms of oppression would finally be put
to rest.
Over the past sixty years, the Indian Supreme Court has developed a
body of case law that articulates a theory of social reform, and theorizes a
relationship between the legal order and the social structure. The case law in
this area has undergone numerous evolutions and is the subject of a great deal
code throughout the territory of India."); see JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 115.
52. JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 115.
53. See Zoha Hasan, Communal Mobilization and Changing Majority in Uttar Pradesh, in
CONTESTING THE NATION: RELIGION, COMMUNITY, AND THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRACY IN INDIA 81
(David Ludden ed., 1996); INST. OF OBJECTIVE STUDIES, MARGINAL MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN INDIA
(M.K.A. Siddiqui ed., 2004); PM, Advani Agree Muslims Lag in Education, TIMES OF INDIA, May 18,
2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-2058355,prtpage- .cms.
54. See JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 31, 112-16.
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of existing scholarship. 55 This Part will focus on just two cases, State of
Kerala v. N.M. Thomas56 and Indra Sawhney v. Union of India,57 which
illustrate how the Court evaluates the law's interventionist role in the social
order. The goals of this Part are not to trace the evolution of constitutional
doctrine on reservation policy, but instead to trace the outlines of the Court's
approach and to highlight the assumptions about the relationship between the
constitution's objective for social reform and structures of inequality.
Before turning to these cases, I must make a further caveat. Since 1995,
the Indian Parliament and Supreme Court have engaged in a series of
exchanges that has, in the end, extended the reservation benefits beyond those
originally included in the constitutional text. 58 This recent series of
constitutional amendments underscores that the Indian Constitution is a
product of exchanges between the legislature and the courts, and also a result
of popular mobilizations by members of the castes and political parties.
59
Equality law in India is not a static monolith. The shifting political and social
arrangements that have shaped Indian equality law have changed it in
important respects.
60
These specific changes in the reservation policy and the surrounding
case law that have occurred in recent years, however, are not directly relevant
to the tension in the doctrine that this Note aims to identify. Rather than
attempting to tell every aspect of this complex story, this Part focuses on the
N.M Thomas and Indra Sawhney cases to illustrate the way that the Court has
conceptualized the relationship between law and the problem of social
subordination. Each case marks a turning point in the constitutional doctrine
of reservations, with respect to higher education, or the extent of the policy's
protections, but while this Part will touch on the details of the doctrine, it will
not extensively elaborate on them. Instead, this Part presents the underlying
objectives of social reform in India in order to provide context for the more
detailed analysis of the doctrine addressing religious conversion and
intermarriage and to draw contrasts to U.S. equal protection jurisprudence.
A. N.M. Thomas and the Constitutional Concept of Equality
In 1973, the Indian Supreme Court considered the case of the State of
Kerala v. N.M Thomas.6 1 The case involved a challenge to a provision of the
Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, which gave members of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes temporary preference in promotions
for state employment. In the course of upholding the provisions granting
55. See GALANTER, supra note 6, at 147-53.
56. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490.
57. (1993) 1 S.C.J. 353.
58. See RAJEEV DHAVAN, RESERVED! How PARLIAMENT DEBATED RESERVATIONS 1995-2007,
at 7-10 (2008) (outlining the central cases and constitutional amendments the legislature passed during
this period). For a similar view of legislative constitutionalism in the American context, see Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation
of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1946-48 (2003).
59. See LUCIA MICHELu-rl, THE VERNACULARISATION OF DEMOCRACY: POLITICS, CASTE,
AND RELIGION IN INDIA 8-25 (2008).
60. Id. at 20-24.
61. A.I.R.1976 S.C. 490.
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special standards for members of the Scheduled Castes, the Court offered one
of its most complete explanations of the conception of equality that lies at the
heart of the constitution's commitment to social reform. In N.M. Thomas, a
lower division clerk in Kerala challenged the State's promotions policy, which
guaranteed a certain number of slots for members of the lower castes and
tribes, as being in violation of the prohibition against discrimination in Article
15 and the guarantee of equality before the law in Article 14.62
The Court acknowledged the numerous provisions of the constitution
that provide special treatment to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes despite the
guarantee of equality before the law:
The Constitution makes a classification of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in
numerous provisions and gives a mandate to the State to accord special or favoured
treatment to them. Article 46 contains a Directive Principle of State policy-fundamental
in the governance of the country enjoining the state to promote with special care
educational and economic interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to
protect them from any social injustice and exploitation. 63
From the provisions contained in the constitution, the Court developed a
particular theory of equal citizenship that was consistent with its view of the
constitution's aspiration to end untouchability. "Equality," the Court reasoned,
"is amongst equals. Classification is, therefore, to be founded on substantial
differences which distinguish persons grouped together from those left out of
the groups and such differential attributes must bear a just and rational relation
to the object sought to be achieved., 64 For the purposes of Article 14, then, the
guarantee of equality did not simply mean equality among individuals, but
needed to be understood as applying among similarly situated groups.65
In defense of this conception of equality, Judge Krishna Iyer, writing in
support of the majority, offered an account of the experience of the
untouchables throughout Indian history:
The Father of the Nation adopted, as his fighting faith, the uplift of the bhangi and the
assimilation, on equal footing, into Hindu society, and the Constitution ... made social
justice a founding faith and built into it humanist provisions to lift the level of the lowly
scheduled castes and tribes to make democracy viable for all. Studies in social
anthropology tell us how cultural and material suppression has, over the ages, crippled
their personality, and current demography says that nearly every fifth Indian is a harijan
and his social milieu is steeped in squalour.
66
Judge Iyer described the constitution's commitment to eradicating social
inequality, along with a history of the caste system and its effects on the lower
67castes. He provided a narrative of the foundation of the new nation that
explicitly breaks from this past and that is rooted in a commitment to social
62. Id. at 495.
63. Id. at 500.
64. Id. at 497.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 529 (opinion of lyer, J.).
67. Id. For a survey of Judge lyer's jurisprudence on social reform, see P. KRISHNASWAMY,
JUSTICE VR. KRISHNA IYER: A LIVING LEGEND 176-82 (2000). "Krishna lyer left his imprint on almost
all dimensions of human rights jurisprudence. He propounded new interpretative approaches to
livelihood and employment security, to penal law and prison law and introduced new concepts like [the]
law of poverty." Id. at 178.
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transformation through the law.68 Toward the end of the opinion, he quoted a
speech made by Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar at the Constituent Assembly
during the debates over the reservation policy: "[W]e have in India a society
based on privilege of graded inequality which means elevation for some and
degradation of others .... We must remove [social inequality] . . .or else
those who suffer from [it] will blow up the structure of political democracy
which this Assembly has so laboriously built up."
69
Judge Iyer then described the memories of the ancient atrocities of the
caste system, which remained visible throughout Indian society in the present:
"[T]he Court must so interpret the language" in the equality provisions, he
wrote, "to remove that ugly 'inferiority' complex which has done genetic
damage to Indian policy and thereby suppress the malady and advance the
remedy, informed by sociology and social anthropology." 7 Judge Iyer
envisioned the effects of the history of the caste system as having deep roots
in Indian society, roots that could not be easily untangled with the sharp
distinctions of legal doctrine. "If the Court has its listening posts on raw
Indian earth," he concluded, "its assessment of 'equal opportunity' cannot
remain legalistic or individualistic but should see the age-old inequality to
mend which is also the means to real equality, a demanding command of our
Constitution."' 71 He saw that the caste system was in fact alive throughout
society and that its effects could be seen everywhere. The efforts to apply
rigid constitutional provisions to a nation that was still living out the
consequences of its past wrongs required an unusual combination of intuition
and historical sensitivity.
There was hope, Judge Iyer suggested, in at least some other aspects of
the nation's history. "The roots of our constitutional ideas," he argued, "can
be traced to our ancient culture. The noble Upanishadic behest of collective
acquisition of cultural strength . . . is involved in and must evolve out of
'equality', if we are true to the subtle substance of our finer heritage." 72 With
this suggestion, he offered a more imaginative historical narrative about
India's past that aimed to rewrite Indian history to include not only simply
casteism and social oppression but also the ideas contained in the constitution.
Constitutional doctrine would need to be attentive to the entrenched
disabilities and cultural artifacts-the lived experience--of caste, but it might
also reconfigure memory itself.
This new conception of equality was not a constitutional abstraction
distant from everyday experience or India's long history, or a foreign notion
imported from Western political theory, but was, along with the caste system,
rooted in the nation's past. This new conception of equality, Judge Iyer
argued, had been learned from this experience. He suggested that India's past
would need to be rewritten to emphasize that equality is indeed part of Indian
history, and that the constitution reflects the realization of ideals that were not
brought from abroad but instead grew from Indian national experience.
68. N.M. Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. at 529 (opinion of lyer, J.).
69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. at 530.
71. Id. at 539.
72. Id. at 532.
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B. Indra Sawhney and the Return to Localism
In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, decided in 1993, the Supreme Court
again considered the underlying principles at the heart of the reservation
policy." The Court settled the question of whether the constitutional concepts
of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes should take into consideration
economic advantage and held that the most economically advantaged
members of a Scheduled Caste or Tribe could not claim reservations under the
policy. In considering the difficult question of what significance economic
status should have within the reservation policy, the Court turned to the
history of the caste system in order to explain its continuing salience in Indian
society.
Judge Kuldip Singh's opinion offered a devastating account of the
history of caste. "The caste system as projected by Manu and accepted by the
Hindu Society," he wrote, "has proved to be the biggest curse for this
country .... With the passage of time the caste-system became the cancer-cell
of the Hindu society. 74 The social and political divisions imposed by the
caste system, he speculated, had made India vulnerable to invasion and
colonial exploitation:
This country remained under shackles of slavery for over one thousand years. The reason
for our inability to fight the foreign-rule was the social degeneration of India because of
the caste-system. To rule this country it was not necessary to divide the people, the caste-
system conveyed the message "Divided we are-come and rule us."
75
This story about caste is less about the effect of caste on the victims than on
its effect on the whole society. Caste had been a "cancer" that plagued the
76health of the nation. The modernizing effect of legal reform, in his view, was
the medicine that would be necessary to cure the society of this past. "The
Constitution," Judge Singh wrote, "completely obliterated the caste-system
and assured equality before law . . . . The progress of India has been from
casteism to egalitarianism-from feudalism to freedom. 77
This history has continued to reproduce itself, and the burdens of this
past have continued to plague communities where caste identity still afflicts
children at birth. Caste, therefore, is deeply embedded into the normative
commitments of the village communities where it still has strong roots. Judge
Pandian wrote:
The moment a child comes out of the mother's womb in a Hindu family .. . and takes its
first breath and even before its umbilical cord is cut off, the innocent child is branded,
stigmatized, and put in a separate slot according to the caste of its parents despite the fact
that the birth of the child in the particular slot not by choice but by chance.78
"Though in India, caste evil originated from Hindu religion," he continued,
"that evil has taken its root so deep in the social structure of all the Indian
73. (1993) 1 S.C.J. 353.
74. Id. at 453 (opinion of Singh, J.).
75. Id. at 453-54.
76. Id. at 453.
77. Id. at 454.
78. Id. at 374 (opinion of Pandian, J.).
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communities and spread its tentacles far and wide thereby leaving no
community from being influenced by the caste factor."
79
The caste system is reproduced not only through social obligations, but
also through official policies and institutions: "The perpetuation of casteism,
in the words of Swami Vivekanada 'continues social tyranny of ages.' The
caste system has been religiously preserved in many ways including by
judicial verdicts, pronounced according to the traditional Hindu Law." 80 It was
therefore inappropriate, Judge Pandian concluded, to consider caste
membership alone when awarding reservation posts in the government,
because other criteria were necessary to abolish the caste system as a whole.
The caste system had left an indelible mark on communities and institutions
throughout the country, and its effects were not merely associated with caste
membership but spread far beyond the untouchables to some of the
historically higher castes and to other religious communities, such as Muslims
and Christians. 81 Caste membership should be relevant, but it should not be
the dominant criterion.
82
As Judge Thommen emphasized, the relationship between
discrimination in the present and in the past should be the basis for
determining the extent of the reservation policy. Poverty, he concluded, was
not enough to support a designation under the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes, but at the same time, neither was membership in a
particular caste. "[T]he question to be asked, for the purposes of reservation,"
he wrote, "is whether such poverty is the result of identified historical or
continuing discrimination. No matter what caused the discrimination and
exploitation; the question is, did such inequity and injustice result in poverty
and backwardness[.],, 83 The dispositive inquiry, then, was the relationship
between a group's standing in the contemporary society and its history of
prior discrimination. The constitutional protections thus envision a connection
between this history and contemporary discrimination and these links should
be evaluated through an examination of the social meaning of this group
designation over time.
84
The N.M Thomas and Indra Sawhney decisions illustrate the
significance of collective memory in shaping the construction of legal doctrine
to support the reservation policy. Specifically, the cases illustrate the ways
that the Court locates the authority of each caste in the process of social
reform. In these cases, the Court told a set of narratives about the history of
the caste system and crafted a legal doctrine that is attentive to the fact that the
consequences of this history remain embedded in the society. They remain
embedded not only in the lived experience in the social structure, but also in
the values of particular communities and in the identities imposed on
individuals by the structures of authority "the moment a child comes out of
79. Id. at 393.
80. Id. at 375.
81. Id.
82. Id. For an earlier statement of this position, see K.S. Jaysree v. State of Kerala, A.I.R.
1976 S.C. 2381.
83. (1993) 1 S.C.J. at 438 (opinion of Singh, J.).
84. Id.
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the mother's womb. 85 Caste hierarchy continues to be relevant not only for
the deformed skeletons of social and economic inequality it has left behind,
but also for the conceptions of membership and caste and tribal authority that
remain alive in communities throughout the society. Collective memory in
these cases invests particular caste communities with great significance and
serves as the groundwork for their authority.
IV. CASTE MEMBERSHIP AND THE BOUNDARIES OF EQUALITY
The Indra Sawhney and N.M Thomas cases both imagined a new social
order based on a greater commitment to equality, and also contemplated the
continuing salience of the vestiges of these ancient social arrangements. The
Indian Supreme Court, in other words, articulated in these cases a vision of
the project of constitutionalism as the creation of a new social order to undo
the injustices of the past. The Court, however, also appreciated that efforts at
social reform must also engage existing communities that are entrenched in
the social hierarchy.
In view of the continuing salience of these communities, and their
relationship to the past that the constitution repudiates, the Court granted
considerable and surprising deference to each caste in continuing to exert
traditional forms of authority over its members. It granted this authority not
out of a pragmatic gesture to gradualism, but instead because by inviting these
communities to participate in the articulation of new moral commitments, they
would become the basis for interventions in the social order.
A. The Problem of Religious Conversion and Caste Membership
The Indian Constitution's commitment to establish a new social order,
free of the hierarchy of caste, finds expression in a surprising contradiction.
Despite the constitution's explicit claims to reform society and the Court's
continuing insistence that the reservations should not depend exclusively on
caste membership, Indian equality law permits a great deal of deference to the
castes and tribes on these questions. It permits so much deference that it
recognizes them as having an agency and normative generativity that is all
their own.
The Indian Constitution affirms forms of political attachment to caste
communities. The significance of Hinduism in the history of the caste system
makes the question of what happens when a member of a caste converts to a
different religion particularly difficult to untangle. 86 These situations put
substantial pressure on the Court's assertion that reservation benefits should
be awarded on the basis of caste membership, and, as a result, they reveal with
great incisiveness the significance of memory and existing structures of social
authority in shaping the constitutional doctrine supporting the reservation
policy.
8
85. Id. at 374 (opinion ofPandian, J.).
86. See JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 35 n.42 (describing the state of the scholarly debate on
the relationship between Hinduism and caste).
87. Conversion, and especially conversion to Christianity, has been the subject of significant
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The Indian Supreme Court first considered the problem of religious
conversion and the distribution of reservation benefits in 1954. In Chatturbhuj
Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram, 88 the Court considered a
challenge to the nomination of several candidates for election to Congress,
including Gangaram Thaware, who was alleged to have converted to
Christianity. Judge Bose, writing for the Court, noted that "[c]onversion
brings many complexities in its train, for it imports a composite of many
ingredients," and it was therefore necessary to consider the effect of
conversion in its full social and regional context.89 "Religious beliefs," he
continued, "spiritual experience and emotion and intellectual conviction
intermingle with more material considerations such as severance of family and
social ties and the casting off or retention of old customs and observances."
90
As a result, the Court determined that it was necessary to consider three
factors to evaluate the effect of the conversion on the right to claim
reservation benefits: "(1) the reactions of the old body, (2) the intentions of
the individual himself and (3) the rules of the new order." 91 The convert's
fight to claim caste membership would depend largely on the caste's own
rules, both formal and informal, for tolerating the religion that he hoped to
join. The reaction of the caste to the conversion would in many cases be the
crucial factor in the Court's determination. "If the old order is tolerant of the
new faith and sees no reason to outcaste or excommunicate the convert and
the individual himself desires and intends to retain his old social ties," then
"when we have to consider the legal and political rights of the old body, the
views of the new faith hardly matter."
92
Applying these criteria, the Court relied on testimony of members of the
Mahar caste to determine the rules of this body and its reaction to the
conversion. 93 None of the witnesses whom the lower court called could offer
an example of the caste excommunicating a member for conversion to
Christianity or any other religion. "No single instance," the Supreme Court
noted, "has been produced in which any person.., has ever been outcasted
from the Mahars [because of conversion] ... and as the sect is said to be over
1000 years old, there has been enough time for such instances to
accumulate." 94 The Court ultimately found that the caste's own rules were
more significant than the response of the new faith embraced by the convert,
and that "conversion to this sect imports little beyond an intellectual
acceptance of certain ideological tenets" and does not result in a loss of caste
membership.
95
Recent cases have continued to grant the castes considerable deference
to make their own rules for excommunication in cases of conversion. The
controversy and political turmoil in India. See Kukum Sangari, Gender Lines, Personal Laws,
Conversion, 27 Soc. SCIENTIST 17 (1999).
88. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 236.
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caste's reaction to the conversion has become the only factor of any salience
in the Court's determination of whether or not a convert can claim benefits
under the reservation policy. In Guntur Medical College v. Mohan Rao,96 the
Court was faced with the question of whether a person whose parents had
been members of a Scheduled Caste, but had converted to Christianity, could
claim caste membership upon reconversion to Hinduism. Mohan Rao had
applied for admission to the medical college in the State of Andhra Pradesh
and his application was denied.9 7 He subsequently renounced Christianity and
went through the necessary ceremonies to reconvert to his parents' caste, the
Madiga. The medical college, however, again denied his application for one of
the seats reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes, because "[n]o
candidates can claim to belong to the Scheduled Castes except by birth."9 8
The Court emphasized once more that each caste has the authority to
sets its own rules for membership, even where there might be reason to be
suspicious of the individual's motives for electing to convert to Hinduism:
It is for the members of the caste to decide whether or not to admit a person within the
caste. Since the caste is a social combination of persons governed by its rules and
regulations, it may, if its rules and regulations so provide, admit a new member just as it
may expel an old one. The only requirement for admission of a person as a member of the
caste is acceptance of that person by the other members of the caste, for as pointed out by
[Judge] Krishnaswami Ayyangar,..."in matters affecting the well being or composition
of a caste, the caste itself is the supreme judge." 99
The Court reasoned that, when determining whether a particular individual
should be granted a reservation, courts should give considerable deference to
the sovereignty of the caste in determining its own terms of membership. The
Court noted that caste has both a social and political dimension.too The social
meaning of conversion can only be understood, then, from inside the caste
itself, and these meanings are given expression in the particular rules and
regulations that a caste develops to adjudicate these disputes. Even if the
elimination of the caste system is one of the primary goals of the constitution,
it is unwise, the Court found, to allow law to reach within the caste itself and
attempt to alter its shared commitments and values.
B. Marriage and Community Sovereignty
The Indian Supreme Court has developed a similarly deferential
approach in cases where marriage outside of the caste or tribe jeopardizes a
claim of reservation benefits. The case of N.E. Horo v. Smt. Jahan Ara Jaipal
Singh,10 1 decided in 1972, involved a challenge to the eligibility of a woman
who attempted to run for a seat in Parliament that had been reserved for a
member of the Munda tribe, one of the Scheduled Tribes given special
96. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1904.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1906.
99. Id. at 1908 (emphasis added and different emphasis omitted) (quoting Durgaprasada Rao
v. Sudarsanaswami, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 513, 516 (opinion of Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.)).
100. Id.
101. A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1840; see ROBERT PARKIN, THE MUNDA OF CENTRAL ASIA: AN AccouNT
OF THEIR SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (1992).
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designation under the constitution. The Respondent had not been born a
member of the Munda tribe, but she argued that she had acquired membership
in it by marriage and was therefore eligible to run for the seat. 102
Traditionally, the Court acknowledged, "whatever might have been the origin
of the Hindu castes and tribes in ancient times, gradually status [in a caste]
came to be based on birth alone." 10 3 As a result, a person who had been born
into a particular caste or tribe would have probably not been able to alter that
status over the course of his or her lifetime.10 4 Nonetheless, over time, the
Munda and other tribes had entered Indian society, and the past application of
certain rules was not a reason to apply them today.1
0 5
The seats in Parliament had been reserved for each caste or tribe so that
"the community, as a whole, [could have] a right of representation and
therefore the question of the membership of a particular individual of that
community could not be considered divorced from the very object of
legislation."' 1 6 The Court determined that whatever had been done in the past,
the current practice among the Munda was to allow the community authorities
to sanction the marriage. The Court considered evidence of the ceremonial
practices that the Munda use in order to approve a marriage between a Munda
man and a non-Munda woman, and the ceremonies that were done to approve
Ara's marriage in this case. A member of the Munda tribe described the
ceremonies that take place after a wedding between a Munda male and a non-
Munda: "[A] feast is given and if the elders of the society accept the marriage
and participate in the feast that by itself would show that the tribal society has
accepted the marriage and the wife has become a member of the tribe."
10 7
There was evidence to show, provided by Ara's nephew, that these
ceremonies were performed after the wedding.0o "From all this evidence[,]"
the Court concluded, "it is proved that once the marriage of a Munda male
with a non-Munda female is approved or sanctioned by the Parha panchayat
[regional tribal government] they become members of the community."' 10 9
There was tension, however, between deference to the practices of these
communities and the hope, at the center of the project of Indian
constitutionalism, to remake society through legal reform. "When a person, in
the course of time," the Court concluded, "has been assimilated in the
community it is somewhat difficult to comprehend how that person can be
denied the rights and privileges which may be conferred on that community
even though tribal by constitutional provisions."' 10 Even as it noted that such
deference was the only acceptable result, the Court acknowledged that the
community had been recognized under "constitutional provisions.""' This
deference to membership rules of particular tribes and castes, then, expresses
102. A.I.R. 1972 S.C. at 1848.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1846-49.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1846.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1849.
110. Id. at 1850 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
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a tension between an aspiration to social reform, and a deep sensitivity to the
entrenched values associated with the caste system in Indian society and in
each of these communities. Moreover, as this case demonstrates, many of
these communities were changing, if gradually, and it was inappropriate to
attempt to establish a uniform rule that would interfere with what appeared to
be an ongoing process of reform within each caste.
C. Caste Sovereignty and the Boundaries of Reform
The reasons for this deference to caste are rooted in the different ways
that the Court conceptualizes the relationship between legal doctrine and
sources of normative authority that are associated with the structure of the
caste system. In each of the cases, the Court recognized the persistence of the
rules and practices in these communities over time, and the extent to which
the notion of membership in a particular caste group is connected to the
Court's impression of the deep roots of some of these practices. More
crucially, the caste's status is a source of authority over the individuals that
comprise it, and this conception of authority lies in a particular form of
memory that resists the repudiation of the caste system articulated in the
constitutional principle. As the Court observed in Chatturbhuj, there had been
"[n]o single instance" in which any person had been excluded from the caste
because of religious conversion, "and as the sect is said to be over 1000 years
old, there has been time enough for such instances to accumulate."' 12 Each
caste, the Court implied, obtained the ground for its authority, and the
constituent components of its identity, from the memories-including
narratives, stories, and rituals-that were shared by members of the caste.
In Ganpat v. Presiding Officer, the Court argued that "[t]he monstrous
curse of untouchability has got to be eradicated," and that it must "be
eradicated not merely by making constitutional provisions or laws but also by
eradicating it from the minds and hearts of men."1 13 These cases involving
caste membership, however, seem to be very much at odds with this stated
aspiration. The Court not only recognized the existence of caste hierarchies in
formal doctrine-for, indeed, the constitution had already done that-but it
also gave constitutional status to the political authority of the system of caste
governance.
By giving each caste the opportunity to determine its own rules of
membership, the Court gave the lower castes the authority to reproduce
themselves over time, by reasserting ancient rules of membership.Pi4 Such
rules could, in many cases, allow prejudice and skepticism among the tribes to
112. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 236, 245.
113. A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 420, 424.
114. A similar theory is at the heart of U.S. federalism jurisprudence with respect to Native
American tribes in the sense that such tribes generate their own norms in relation to the broader polity,
but can nonetheless remain sites of substantial prejudice. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 55 (1978); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56
U. CH. L. REv. 671, 751 (1989) ("[W]e also know that some communities are communities of
oppression. In Marilyn Friedman's words, '[b]esides excluding or suppressing outsiders, the practices
and traditions of many communities are exploitative and oppressive toward many of their own members.
This problem is of special relevance to women."' (quoting Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern
Friendship: Dislocating the Community, 99 ETHIcS 275, 281 (1989))).
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deepen. It gave each caste the authority to establish either more traditional
rules of membership-such as rules refusing to recognize marriages with
outsiders-or more liberal rules that reflected changing conceptions of the
significance of caste in Indian society. Rather than attempt to require each
caste to adopt a certain legal definition of membership, one that would reflect
a certain constitutional conception of equality, the Court allowed the tribes to
craft their own evolving definitions of membership that would then be used by
the state in the allocation of reservation posts and other opportunities and legal
entitlements. 1
15
1. The Caste and the Nomos
The Indian caste system is different from the forms of social hierarchy,
such as race, gender or sexual orientation, that are more familiar in the U.S.
context. Jack Balkin has used the term "status hierarchy" to describe the
characteristics of these arrangements:
Social status is the degree of prestige and honor that individuals or groups enjoy. This
prestige involves the approval, respect, admiration, or positive qualities imputed to a
person or group. Lower social status confers and imputes corresponding disapproval and
negative qualities. Although individuals may have different degrees of status within a
single group, they also have status because they are members of a group. . . . In many
societies, status hierarchies emerge between groups with distinctive identities or styles of
life.
116
The Indian caste system, however, has at least one characteristic that makes it
different from the "status hierarchies" that Balkin describes. At its core, the
Indian caste system imposes a social status in the more familiar sense-like
race, gender, and class-but it also has attributes that these more familiar
status hierarchies do not. In particular, the caste system is a hierarchical social
arrangement with ongoing ties of social and political affiliation that provide
forms of legal and political authority that are separate from, but undoubtedly
related to, the status conferred on each individual because of his or her
membership in a group within a status hierarchy.
The structures of authority in each caste, which complicate the project of
social reform, have more in common with the "interpretive communities"
described by Robert Cover than they do with a conception of a status
hierarchy.' 7In fact, they have more in common with these communities than
with Balkin's hierarchical conception of these communities that posits that
each is defined primarily by its relationship to the social hierarchy. Cover
believed that these communities were notable for the powerful forms of
"jurisgenesis," or the process by which normative commitments are shaped
and articulated by a community, that were possible because of the overlapping
forms of religious and legal authority that constituted the communities.
Cover argued:
115. See Resnik, supra note 114, at 751.
116. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2321-23 (1997).
117. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4,26 (1983).
118. Id.atll,40-41.
2010]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 35:199
Sectarian communities differ from most-but not all-other communities in the degree to
which they establish a nomos of their own. They characteristically construct their own
myths, lay down their own precepts, and presume to establish their own hierarchies of
norms. More importantly, they identify their own paradigms for lawful behavior and
reduce the state to just one element, albeit an important one, in the normative
environment. 119
These communities were more capable of generating new normative
commitments not merely because they were more intimate, but also because
they enabled a connection to an imagined past that was itself a source of
normative authority. These sectarian communities were especially significant
for Cover, because they resembled the ancient forms of attachment that he
called "paidiec communities," which combined "a common understanding of
creed and ritual" with "a common understanding of their relation to the
primordial, imaginary, true unity that occurred in a vanished instant of long
ago. ' 2 ° Like Cover's sectarian communities, each caste has its own forms of
political authority that are historically and culturally determined. The caste
communities are part of an ancient tradition that gives their normative
commitments authority distinct from state-centered conceptions of law.
Applying Cover's argument, it is possible to see that the caste system is
thus not simply a hierarchy of status in the conventional sense, but also
involves attachment to communities with normative authority over their
members. Scholars have not appreciated the implications of Cover's view of
the relationship between law and social authority for U.S. scholarship on
antisubordination. Conversely, the Indian Supreme Court has found that this
normative authority has great significance in the ongoing effort of social
reform through law. The doctrine on reservation policy is therefore sensitive
not only to the persistence of group identities that correspond to a
comprehensive hierarchy in Indian society, but also to the forms of political
attachment that coincide with caste membership. In other words, the Court
envisions each caste community as continually engaged in a project of
redefining its own terms of membership in ways that may, at some point in the
future, cut at the core of the persistent and intractable salience of caste.
The doctrine that the Court developed to address questions that involve
the substantive authority of these communities and the constitution's
commitment to legal reform takes Cover's invitation to "stop circumscribing
the nomos" and "invite new worlds.'1 2 1 The doctrine serves as an invitation to
these communities to reform their own rules to embody the constitutional
commitment to social reform, but the Court stops short of requiring the castes
or tribes to enact these rules. Instead, the Court allows these communities to
devise their own rules, and to protect their own conceptions of caste identity
in the face of ongoing injustice and social subordination. "It is even more
important," the Court found in Ganpat, "that members of communities who
are untouchables should assert their self-respect and fight for their dignity
than that the members of other communities should forget about it."' 2 The
119. Id. at 33.
120. Id. at 15.
121. Id. at 68.
122. A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 420, 424.
220
Caste and the Problem of Social Reform
risks associated with reinscribing caste identity and the coercive authority of
the caste structure are acceptable, the Court suggests, because it is ultimately
necessary to preserve the existing borders of communities in order to achieve
the constitution's aspiration for greater equality and, ultimately, the
elimination of caste hierarchies. The Court, however, goes further than simply
recognizing caste as a relevant criterion for the distribution of entitlements in
society. It also affirms the constitutive authority of a caste to define itself. The
hope is that by giving each caste the capacity to participate in refashioning the
nation's social arrangements, new conceptions of social equality will be
deeper and more sustainable, because they will come from within the caste
itself.
Cover's description of interpretative communities, and his suggestion
that a constructed past often gives these communities their greatest
significance, underscores the importance of the memory of the caste system
for Indian equality law. 123 As Benedict Anderson has argued, an imagined
past often underlies political authority, and in many ways a necessary
foundation for it.124 The Court's emphasis on the rootedness of the injustices
in Indian history are, in a sense, a way of marking a departure from that past,
and of indicating that the constitution will depart from this history. This
dimension of the Court's use of historical narrative, however, is profoundly
"jurispathic," in Cover's terminology. 125 The abstract principles of legal
meaning, Cover worried, "exercise[d their] superior brute force . .. [and]
shut[] down the creative hermeneutic of principle that is spread throughout
our communities."'
' 26
From Cover's point of view, the Indian Constitution's intention to mark
time by breaking free from the persistence of the caste system would thus be a
project fraught with self-contradiction, because it does violence to the existing
social arrangements that were connected to powerful memories that were the
source of authority and genuine normative affiliation.' 27 In the process of
enacting a new social order based on constitutional principles, the project of
equality runs up against the sources of normative authority that are grounded
in memories supporting ongoing forms of attachment and political power
within caste communities.
The narrative of the caste system told by the Court is also a statement of
continuity, of the persistence of these structures in modem India, and of their
continuing salience in people's lives. Moreover, the narrative is about the
challenge posed not only by the hierarchical structure of the caste system, but
also of the continuing ties of attachment that Indians feel to the social and
123. Cover, supra note 117, at 33.
124. Anderson suggests that a nation is "an imagined political community," which "regardless
of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail ... is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
comradeship." BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6-7 (rev. ed. 1991).
125. Cover, supra note 117, at 40.
126. Id. at 44.
127. Id. at 42 ("To state, as I have done, that the problem is one of too much law is to
acknowledge the nomic integrity of each of the communities that have generated principles and
precepts. It is to posit that each 'community of interpretation' that has achieved 'law' has its own
nomos-narratives, experiences, and visions to which the norm articulated is the right response.").
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normative worlds that they inhabit in a particular caste. Caste, Judge Pandian
argued in Indra Sawhney, "has taken its root so deep in the social structure of
all the Indian communities and spread its tentacles far and wide,"', 28 so much
so that it began to impose its authority over a newborn child from the moment
it "takes its first breath."' 129 The historical persistence of caste also created
communities to which individuals feel powerful forms of affiliation. Reading
the history of the caste system offered by the major decisions on reservation
policy from this perspective emphasizes the powerful forms of affiliation of
caste in Indian society, and by implication notes the difficulties inherent in
any serious effort to restructure Indian society through the aspirations of
constitutional principle.
Cover thus helps reveal a basic tension in the uses of memory in equality
law by the Indian Supreme Court. Equality law almost always produces a new
historical narrative, characterized by an explicit repudiation of past injustice
and that references memories of the prior social order. 130 From this point of
view, equality law puts to use a version of history in ways that run counter to
the pervasive memories and perceptions that underlie status relations. On the
other hand, equality law must be engaged in an ongoing and sensitive
relationship both to memory and to the existing social forms which give rise
to these memories. Cover's conception of nomic communities underscores the
fact that the Court understands the nomic community of each caste as the site
of changing norms and changing memories about the history of the caste
system, which are inevitably bound together with the identity and the
normative authority of the caste.
2. Collective Memory and Authority
Whereas history is the mobilization of past events through narrative,
collective memory is rooted in the experience of particular communities in the
collective process of remembering. While history and memory are reinforcing
and overlap in deeply complicated ways,' 31 Cover recognizes that memory, as
a social process, is deeply relevant to law, which is, in part, involved in the
expression of shared understandings that connect to these memories. 132
Collective memory is especially relevant to law, because it describes a process
in which society, or groups within that society, comes to formulate narratives
and shared understandings about the past.' 33
128. (1993) 1 S.C.J. 353, 393 (opinion ofPandian, J.).
129. Id. at 374.
130. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1145 (1997).
131. See Pierre Nora, The Era of Commemoration, in 3 REALMS OF MEMORY: THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH PAST 609, 615-38 (Lawrence D. Kirtzman ed., Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 1998).
132. Cover, supra note 117, at 33.
133. The term "collective memory" has been the subject of a great deal of debate and revision
in the theoretical literature, but for the purposes of this discussion, collective memory simply refers to
the construction of memories within a national social and political context in the conventional sense of
the term. The concept has its origins in the work of Emile Durkheim and Maurice Halbwachs. See
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (Joseph Wardswain trans., 1947);
MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY (Lewis A Coser ed. & trans., 1992); see also JAMES
FENTRESS & CHRIS WICKHAM, SOCIAL MEMORY (1992).
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From the perspective of equality law, therefore, collective memory is
relevant in at least two different ways. First, collective memory articulates
values that ultimately find expression in law-in particular, the repudiation of
past practices-but these memories may not be shared by all or may not be
rooted in the constitutional culture. 34 Second, collective memory engages
with memories that are present in the broader culture; ones that it must
address in order to meaningfully reshape society. It is the tension between
these two dimensions of memory about which Cover's framework is
especially insightful in the context of Indian equality law.
Norman Spaulding has explored this set of difficulties from a somewhat
different perspective. Whereas, for Cover, the significance of history for
equality law was, in part, that it gave legitimacy to existing social structures,
for Spaulding, memory impedes the process of addressing past wrongs
through constitutional principles. 135 Like Cover, Spaulding understands
equality law as having a particular relationship, in contrast to other types of
law, to collective memory. Spaulding aims to understand the way that
memory of past injustices is related to corresponding legal doctrines of
equality that aim to address it. As a general matter, equality law, he suggests,
is engaged in dynamic tension with the collective memory of past wrongs. In
his analysis of the significance of historical memory in shaping the doctrine
that interprets the Reconstruction Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,
Spaulding argues that "[m]emory here confronts the paradox . . . [of] the
insatiable temptation for a nation to elide its grave misdeeds in the very act of
remembrance." 136 This conception of memory as "monument" allows a
community to bury past wrongs under a fictional and triumphalist narrative.
Such is the case with the Reconstruction Amendments and their surrounding
mythology, which allowed the nation to move beyond the wrongs of slavery
with the myth that the people of the nation have fully repudiated them in legal
principle.
In contrast to this monumental version of history, in which constitutional
principles render other sources of memory impotent and useless, Spaulding
proposes a theory of "countermemory," which emphasizes the need to involve
the broader civic community in the remembrance of past injustices. 137
"Countermonuments," Spaulding writes, "and the mode of historical
consciousness they reflect are committed to a more rigorous form of memory
work, one that seeks and exposes precisely what collective memory wishes
(indeed, needs) to forge, what memory resists remembering."' 38 They relocate
the site of remembrance in smaller communities of commitment to engage
134. Robert W. Gordon, for example, discusses the ways that the memory of the atrocities of
World War II was relevant in the drafting of postwar European constitutions. Robert W. Gordon,
Undoing Historical Injustice, in JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 35, 35 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 1996) ("Each [legal] response comes embedded in a history, a narrative
that stitches together the society's past and future.").
135. Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction,
and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1992, 1992-95 (2003).
136. Id. at 2001 (emphasis omitted).
137. Id. at2003.
138. Id. at 2004.
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them in a more active process of reform.' 39 Whereas the memory of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that it ended slavery and racial prejudice and
inaugurated a principle of equality before the law, the countermemory of it
would be rooted in the continuous remembering of the lineage of our present
injustices.
The theoretical frameworks provided by Cover and Spaulding are
complementary. Cover's ambitions are much broader and his claims about the
nature of legal relationships reach much farther. However, Spaulding's
narrower focus on memory, which he explicitly situates in reference to
Cover, 40 helps explain the particular narrative of injustice in India's past, and
the subsequent repudiation of that memory in the doctrine that recognizes the
authority of each caste to promulgate its own rules and engage in its own
process of forming shared memories about its origins.
The Indian Supreme Court engages in several forms of memory
discourse throughout these cases. In some sections of N.M. Thomas and Indra
Sawhney, the Court mostly engages in a form of collective memory that is
more akin to the "monumental history" that Spaulding critiques; there, the
Indian Supreme Court is primarily interested in asserting the ways that the
constitution will denote a sharp break with the past.' 4 Alternatively, at other
places in these decisions and, more implicitly, in the line of decisions granting
authority to each caste, the Court engages in a form of countermemory,
because it both recognizes the persistent salience of caste and also notes that
rules of caste membership, which are connected to memories about the
identity of the caste and its history as well as narratives about the significance
of the caste system in Indian history. 142 These narratives are what, in a
Coverian sense, help to deepen the feelings of attachment that caste members
would have to each community. 143
3. Nancy Fraser and the Question of Remedy
In order to clarify further the tensions within the Indian Supreme Court's
approach to social authority and memory, it is useful to turn to the framework
developed by Nancy Fraser to describe the two basic strategies for
undertaking a program of reform. 144 Fraser draws a helpful distinction
between "transformative" and "affirmative" remedies aimed at ending forms
of structural inequality.
"Affirmative remedies," Fraser writes, are associated with "mainstream
multiculturalism," and attempt to "redress disrespect by revealing unjustly
devalued group identities, while leaving intact both the contents of those
identities and the group differentiations that underlie them."', 45 Alternatively,
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1998 n.42 (citing Cover, supra note 117, at 4).
141. See, e.g., State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490, 493.
142. William R. Pinch, Reinventing Ramamand: Caste and Hierarchy in Gangetic India, 30
MOD. ASIAN STUD. 549 (1996).
143. Cover, supra note 117, at 44.
144. NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST"
CONDITION 24 (1997).
145. Id.
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"transformative remedies . . . are associated with deconstruction [and] . ..
[w]ould redress disrespect by transforming the underlying cultural-valuational
structure., 14 6 "By destabilizing existing group identities and differentiations,"
Fraser concludes, "these remedies would not only raise the self-esteem of
members of currently disrespected groups; they would change everyone's
sense of self."
147
Transformative remedies aim to avoid the central paradox of an
affirmative remedy, which is that its recognition of group identities, "as
iterated over time, tends to set in motion a second-stigmatizing-recognition
dynamic, which contradicts its official commitment to universalism." 148
Official recognition of the identities of groups who have experienced past
injustice can result in their stigmatization and backlash against them,
frustrating the effort to restructure society in pursuit of greater equality.
Fraser's approach, unlike Spaulding's or in some ways Cover's, is less
concerned with the problem of memory, because it takes an even broader view
of the difficulties associated with reforming a system of status relations. While
Fraser is more interested in the fundamental problem of culturally constructed
identities, her conception of the relationship between law and entrenched
social hierarchy is useful for understanding the functions of memory, and the
shared group identities of which memory is a part, within Indian equality law.
To deconstruct both gender and race, she argues, would require "that all
people be weaned from their attachment to current cultural constructions of
their identities and interests."1 49 These identities and cultural constructions are
deeply held, and are shaped and given authority by memory in the ways that
Spaulding and Cover describe.
In Fraser's typology, the Indian Supreme Court's doctrinal approach
may not be fully amenable to straightforward categorization as either
transformative or affirmative, but this distinction helps to reveal some of its
most salient aspects.' 50 The constitutional recognition of affirmation of caste
membership as a basis for the distribution of entitlements is an explicit
affirmation of the status of these historically disadvantaged groups. On the
other hand, recognition of the political authority of each caste to establish its
own standards of membership is also an effort to ensure that the constitutional
principles articulated by courts do not frustrate a process of reform grounded
in local communities.
Indian constitutional doctrine therefore takes as a starting point the
notion that the deconstruction of caste-based hierarchies must occur through
the channels of normative authority that constitute the caste system itself.
Rather than attempting to eliminate caste hierarchies through either a
commitment to formal equality that prohibits all recognition of caste, or a
146. Id.
147. Id.
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formal recognition of caste hierarchies aimed at granting some castes greater
standing, the Court also assented to the ongoing political significance of the
structures of caste governance so that they might be deconstructed over time.
The relationship between caste authority and constitutional
commitments to equality is based on subordinate normative communities in
which the authority of law and caste can powerfully reinforce one another.
Strangely, the emphasis in the doctrine is rarely on the continuing persistence
of historical inequities, or even in many cases on a showing of prejudice. The
Court instead puts the focus on the historically determined sovereignty of the
castes and tribes to inscribe their own borders and to participate, at the level of
each locality and community, in the process of eradicating the caste system.
The constitutional aspiration to reform depends on the assent and indeed
the active participation of a society that has many entrenched sites of
authority. The constitutional guarantee of equality can only be achieved, then,
with the involvement of the castes and tribes, and a dynamic interaction
between established sources of memory and jurisgenesis and the force of
constitutional principle.151
V. A VIEW OF INDIAN EQUALITY LAW FROM U.S. SHORES
AND VICE VERSA
The most obvious analog to the notion of caste in Indian jurisprudence
in U.S. constitutional law is almost certainly race. 152 Like caste in India, racial
inequality in the United States has deep roots in U.S. history still visible
today. The constitutional provisions articulating the principles of modem U.S.
equality law, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, were drafted, in
large part, to address the injustices perpetrated under slavery.' 53 Furthermore,
as in Indian debates over poverty and social injustice, the history of slavery
and segregation still shapes debates about the legal treatment of race in the
United States as well as formal constitutional discourse about its legal
status. 1
54
Indian law's deep commitment to remedying forms of past status harm
suggests that both Indian equality law and U.S. equal protection doctrine
include anticlassification and antisubordination principles. U.S. lawyers have
identified a struggle between these principles. In debates over the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, proponents of anticlassification argue that the
harms at which the Constitution is directed are a consequence of the invidious
classification of individuals. 55 The antisubordination principle, by contrast,
151. Such an interaction has at least the potential to make the nomos of Indian society whole
again and to create laws that "present not only bodies of rules or doctrine to be understood, but also
worlds to be inhabited." Cover, supra note 117, at 6.
152. See Laura Dudley Jenkins, Race, Caste and Justice: Social Science Categories and
Antidiscrimination Policies in India and the United States, 36 CoNN. L. REV. 747 (2004).
153. These debates, however, were hardly straightforward, and the notion of social reform
during Reconstruction was a subject of deep dispute and, ultimately, was seriously constrained. See
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986).
154. See Siegel, supra note 130, at 1129-48.
155. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004).
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resists the view that the Constitution prohibits such classification, and instead
holds that it is "wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the
inferior social status of historically oppressed groups."
56
The different relationships between antisubordination values and
anticlassification values in each legal system are in part a consequence of the
relationship between memory and law in the two societies. The comparison
also emphasizes what is perhaps the most distinctive feature of India's legal
treatment of caste-its commitment to the recognition of the political
authority of each caste community, and the nuanced conception of the forms
of authority within a social hierarchy that is theorized as an element of
constitutional doctrine.
A. Antisubordination and Anticlassification in India and the United
States
From the perspective of U.S. constitutional law, Indian jurisprudence on
caste is striking, most obviously, for the extent to which it explicitly takes
caste membership into account in the distribution of benefits. The Indian
reservation system is, at its core, a system of quotas, and the U.S. equal
protection tradition has straightforwardly prohibited quotas as a means of
redressing past wrongs.1 57 This commitment to recognizing caste identities in
formal Indian legal doctrine is most clearly stated in Article 15(4), which
provides for "special provisions for the advancement" of historically
disadvantaged groups. 158 In contrast to equal protection doctrine in the United
States, Indian case law is more explicit about its concern with the extent to
which caste is connected to status hierarchies. Indeed, the Indian Supreme
Court has explicitly repudiated a reading of Article 14, the basic guarantee of
equality, as expressing a conception of formal equality.1
59
From the earliest cases on the reservation policy, the Indian Supreme
Court made explicit references to U.S. case law on affirmative action. Judge
Mathew wrote in N.M. Thomas:
The guarantee of equality is a guarantee of something more than what is required by
formal equality. It implies differential treatment of persons who are unequal. [The]
[e]galitarian principle has therefore enhanced the growing belief that the government has
156. See id. at 1472. This line of argument about the Equal Protection Clause is most often
traced to the contributions of Owen Fiss. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). Recent contributions in this tradition include Balkin, supra note 116;
Siegel, supra note 130; and Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 487 (1998). It is commonly
accepted, however, that the present day Supreme Court has expressed its assent to anticlassification in
its interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, though scholars continue to debate the persistence of
antisubordination values in equal protection doctrine. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495 (2000); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989).
157. Jenkins, supra note 152, at 756; see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
158. INDIA CONST. art. 15, § 4.
159. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490, 516 (opinion of Mathew, J.).
2010]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 35:199
an affirmative duty to eliminate inequalities and to provide opportunities for the exercise
of human rights and claims.160
Such comfort with the distribution of entitlements to groups under a principle
of equality law is less familiar to those in the United States. 161
While anticlassification and antisubordination values may be deeply
intertwined in the U.S. tradition, 162 the anticlassification principle has deep
roots in understandings of the constitutional salience of race in the United
States. "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race," Chief Justice
John Roberts wrote in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1, "is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."' 163
Similarly, the Court noted with greater nuance in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.:
To accept [a] claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid
racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for "remedial relief' for
every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where
race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of
shifting preferences based on inherently immeasurable claims of past wrongs.'64
Such readings of the equality provisions under the Indian Constitution would
be difficult to conceptualize, given the explicit guarantee in Article 15(4) that
the state will, in some cases, use racial categories and even quotas to distribute
entitlements. 65 The notion that the "Constitution is color-blind," as Justice
Harlan famously claimed in his Plessy dissent,' 66 is much harder to support by
any fair reading of the Indian Constitution. "The Constitution of India," the
Indian Supreme Court has reasoned, "is not caste-blind.'
167
The Indian Supreme Court has frequently made explicit comparisons to
the U.S. case law on affirmative action. In early cases on reservationpolicy,
the Indian Court typically avoided citations of foreign law precedents.' Once
the Congress Party (which had risen to dominance during independence and
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 156; Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 9, 9 n.2 (2003) (citing
references).
162. Siegel, supra note 155, at 1475-76; Scott Grinsell, "The Prejudice of Caste": The
Misreading of Justice Harlan and the Ascendency of Anticlassification, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L.
(forthcoming Spring 2010) (on file with author).
163. 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007).
164. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989).
165. See generally State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490, 493.
166. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
167. E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2005) 1 S.C.C. 394, 426. Although this
remark almost certainly references Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy, the Indian Court does not
explicitly note this fact. It is also important to note that Justice Harlan's opinion invokes the metaphor of
"caste" immediately after this sentence, when he famously wrote that "[t]here is no caste here." Plessy,
163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). There is a long history of discussion about "caste" in the U.S.
equal protection tradition that extends to abolitionist arguments about the morality of slavery. The
connections between the example of India and the caste metaphor in U.S. law are extremely complex.
For a study of the history of caste reasoning in the U.S. context and its significance in Justice Harlan's
dissent in Plessy, see Grinsell, supra note 162.
168. Adam M. Smith, Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic
Jurisprudence: The Indian Case, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 218, 251 (2006). On the challenges of citation
to foreign law and Western political theory in the Indian Supreme Court, see Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn,
The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1763, 1794 (2004).
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was more skeptical of foreign authority) receded from power in the late 1970s,
however, the Indian Supreme Court began to cite U.S. case law to help lend
its own decisions greater credibility at home and abroad. 69 In N.M. Thomas-
decided two years before the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision on
affirmative action, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 70-the
Indian Supreme Court saw the U.S. Supreme Court's recent precedents on
criminal procedure and compensatory discrimination as useful analogs to
India's effort to enlist the power of the state to remedy past discrimination.
Judge Mathew wrote:
The force of the idea of a state with obligation [sic] to help the weaker sections of its
members seems to have increasing influence in constitutional law. The idea finds
expression in a number of cases in America involving racial discrimination and also in
the decisions requiring the state to offset the effects of poverty by providing counsel,
transcript of appeal, [sic] expert witnesses, etc.'
7 1
In his extended discussion of the treatment of race in U.S. equal protection
doctrine, Judge Mathew was less interested in the specific doctrinal analysis
of the U.S. Constitution's commitment to equality, and was more interested in
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had reco nized that the power of the
courts could be used in pursuit of social justice.
A careful reading of cases in which the Indian Supreme Court relies on
U.S. precedents shows the Indian Court drawing from case law that rests on
the articulation of antisubordination values in U.S. equal protection doctrine.
In her study of equality law in France and the United States, Julie Suk found
that by "comparing the French and U.S. principles of race-blindness," it
becomes clear that, "as a descriptive matter, the U.S. anticlassification
principle is closer to the antisubordination principle than it is to any universal
or substantive vision of a color blind society that is fully committed to judging
individual citizens on the basis of their individual traits, talents and
abilities."
' 73
While in its basic structure and by its textual provisions, the Indian
Constitution is much more explicitly committed to an antisubordination
principle than the U.S. Constitution, it seems from a close reading of these
cases that in the U.S. equal protection tradition, the anticlassification principle
and the equal protection principle have been, and will likely remain, deeply74
intertwined and reinforcing. 1 4 These cases show the Court relying on
anticlassification values in ways that limit and circumscribe its basic
169. Smith, supra note 168, at 253 ("Almost all of the major cases during this period [1978 to
1991 ] relied heavily on foreign precedent ... .
170. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
171. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490, 516 (opinion of Mathew, J.). The opinion also cited Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955), which required states to provide for payment of trial court transcripts for
indigent persons on appeal; and Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), which struck down a poll tax.
A.I.R. 1976 S.C. at 516-17 (opinion of Mathew, J.).
172. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. at 516-20 (opinion of Mathew, J.) (discussing the factual background to
cases on poverty and race, but not analyzing the relevant doctrine).
173. Suk, supra note 1, at 298-99.
174. See Siegel, supra note 155, at 1547 ("[This account] teaches that concerns about group
subordination are at the heart of the modern equal protection tradition-and, at the same time, suggests
important reasons why such concerns have been persistently disguised, qualified, and bounded.").
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commitment to antisubordination. Often, the anticlassification rhetoric in
these cases expresses the Court's basic commitment to antisubordination
values.
Like the U.S. equal protection tradition, Indian equality law is also
engaged with the problematic tension between these two different conceptions
of equality. "It is no doubt a paradox that though in one sense classification
brings about inequality," Judge Mathew observed in N.M. Thomas, "it is
promotive of equality if its object is to bring those who share a common
characteristic under a class for differential treatment for sufficient and
justifiable reasons."' 175 Or, as the Court pointed out in K.R. Lakshman v.
Karnataka Electricity Board, "It is no doubt true . . . that the classification
should not be carried too far lest it may subvert, [and] perhaps submerge the
precious guarantee of equality." 176 While the Indian Supreme Court has struck
a very different balance between the anticlassification and the
antisubordination principles, it remains sensitive to the complex relationships
that bind them.1
77
In the Indian and U.S. legal traditions, the intersection between
antisubordination and anticlassification values is related to the specific uses of
the memory of past injustice within each culture. Contemporary equal
protection law in the United States articulates an anticlassification principle
that is, in part, framed in reference to the repudiation of chattel slavery and
nineteenth-century gender norms, but that also complicates efforts to address
present injustices because of these references to the extent that present
178injustices look much less troubling than their analogs in collective memory.
The antisubordination reasoning that is often embedded within
anticlassification discourse in U.S. case law sometimes addresses underlying
status hierarchies, and the memory of those hierarchies, with greater force
than is possible under an anticlassification framework.
179
As Robert Post has argued with respect to the U.S. context,
constitutional values and constitutional law exist in a dialectic relationship to
each other. 180 Each depends on, and is the source of, the other. 181 In India, the
subordinated groups themselves become the relevant site of cultural
production and for carrying out the complex forms of exchange between
culture and law, and between organic memories that validate social
hierarchies within the culture and legal constructions of memory that
repudiate that injustice from afar. These communities take on great
significance in the doctrine, because as sites of shared meanings and collective
memory, they are crucial to the success of the effort to upend the hierarchy
and form of social relationships imposed by the caste system.
175. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. at 516 (opinion of Mathew, J.).
176. (2001) 1 S.C.C. 442,448.
177. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 161, at 9-14.
178. Siegel, supra note 130, at 1146 ("The act of repudiating past practices can exculpate
present practices, if we characterize the wrongs of the past narrowly enough to differentiate them from
current regulatory forms.").
179. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 161, at 9-14.
180. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 1418; Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and the Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4,5-10 (2003).
181. Post, supra note 180, at 10.
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B. Antisubordination, Social Hierarchy, and Equality Law: The
Distinctive Challenge Raised by the Indian Case
In contrast to U.S. antidiscrimination law, Indian equality law must
contend with the fact that the caste system is not only a form of social
hierarchy, but also a system of political organization that makes claims on its
members. While race in the United States has some attributes in common with
caste in India, it is difficult to see an analog in the U.S. equal protection
tradition to the combination of legal authority and status hierarchy that is so
striking about the Indian caste system. Although the metaphor of "caste" is a
standard trope in the scholarship on U.S. antidiscrimination law, these
accounts of U.S. law typically do not clearly articulate what the supposed
analog to the Indian caste system is in practice.' 82 Americans do not think of
inclusion in a protected class as involving an attachment to a normative
community with a form of limited sovereignty that should have an
independent status in the law.183 The ascendancy of anticlassification values in
modem U.S. case law has muted such considerations about the normative
worlds created by membership in such groups. 84
To imagine a world such as that would be to suppose that African
Americans under slavery or Jim Crow, or women under a nineteenth-century
system of gender roles, belonged to communities that could be the source of a
form of Coverian jurisgenesis. Taking a somewhat broader view of the U.S.
antisubordination principle, however, suggests that U.S. law responds to these
concerns in a different way. The basic concern at the heart of equal protection
doctrine is, for some observers, the extent to which efforts at legal reform
must be oriented in relation to evolving social practices. In her analysis of the
salience of early debates over Brown v. Board of Education 185 for
understanding the evolution of equal protection doctrine, Reva Siegel has
described the destabilizing effect of interventions by courts to reform a social
order:
As a descriptive matter, concepts of subordination focus attention on agonistic group
relations that structure the polity. As a normative matter, concepts of subordination draw
into question the legitimacy of customary practices and understandings that regulate, and
rationalize, the social position of groups. .. . [A] court seeking to intervene in a status
order must make judgments about when and how to proceed, knowing that, in the end, it
cannot secure systematic change through brute force; efforts to transform a society
182. See Balkin, supra note 116, at 2354.
183. An important exception to this generalization, however, is the voting context. Of course, it
has long been recognized that minority groups play an important role in elections. We often speak of the
"black vote" or the "women's vote" or the "Hispanic vote," and such phrases surely suggest that we
invest these communities with a certain political agency. While it is not blind to importance of these
groups in our electoral process, the mainstream view in election law has been to focus on creating
political communities with diversity among a variety of different groups, rather than on seeing these
groups themselves as independent sources of political authority. See Heather K. Gerken, Second Order
Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1099, 1102 (2005) (describing "first order diversity" as "the conventional
understanding of diversity ... [and] the normative vision associated with statistical integration, the hope
that democratic bodies will someday mirror the polity").
184. See Balkin, supra note 116, at 2350.
185. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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through constitutional adjudication require the political confidence and consent of the
very groups a court would subject to the force of law.' 86
Similar concerns are at the heart of the recognition of caste authority in Indian
equality law, but they are often muted in U.S. cases. U.S. law rests on such a
view of consent, but U.S. doctrine does not respond to this important cultural
background. Indeed, scholars have convincingly shown the ways in which
U.S. constitutional doctrine responds to popular mobilizations, and the ways
in which incursions by the state into the social order shape legal doctrine.
By blessing the political authority of the caste with constitutional status,
the Indian Supreme Court provided space for these historically rooted
communities to participate in an ongoing dialogue about the future of these
status arrangements. Indeed, the Court consented to each caste drawing its
own borders and, in a sense, determining how and when new legal principles
would intervene within an established structure of social arrangements. The
communities within these social arrangements come to develop
understandings of belonging to a particular group in a very meaningful way by
the forms of memory that they share and that so strongly resist the colder and
more detached values articulated by courts.
A comparison to U.S. equality law raises questions about the nature of
the antisubordination and anticlassification principles and their relationship to
communities within a status hierarchy. In particular, considering the status
hierarchies within the United States from the vantage point of Indian law
invites one to ask to what extent the existing social arrangements in the United
States-and especially race and gender-make claims of normative authority
on individuals and to what extent they rely on the shared consent of the groups
that are the subject of these principles. 187
C. The Problem of Belonging in U.S. Equality Law
In the U.S. context, a useful example to illustrate the significance of
group meanings for individuals is the paradigmatic case of interracial
marriage. A person's willingness to reject certain attitudes and pursue a
romantic relationship with a person of a different race, implicates a set of
profound claims about what it means to be a member of that group. It is the
risk of expulsion from the group, the threat of ostracism, with which the
Indian cases on marriage and conversion are most concerned.
Turning to the early cases from the Civil Rights Era involving
miscegenation laws helps to uncover some of the differences between the
186. Siegel, supra note 155, at 1545-46.
187. This conception of membership in a status hierarchy as participation in a community of
belonging is similar to the notion of "culture-race" proposed by Neil Gotanda. "Culture-race includes all
aspects of culture, community, and consciousness. The term includes, for example, the beliefs, and
intellectual and artistic traditions of Black America, and institutions such as Black churches and
colleges." Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 56
(1991) (citation omitted). Gotanda's notion of "culture-race," however, while focused on aspects of
identity and shared understandings, does not articulate a conception of how these forms of identity are
actually also part of a system of authority in which each subordinate community makes claims on
individuals who aim to claim membership in the group by the manipulation of unspoken membership
rules and shared memories.
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approaches that U.S. and Indian law take to the status of the subordinated
groups within a system of equality law. In Loving v. Virginia, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down a state law that prohibited interracial marriage.
88
"The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white
persons," the Court found, "demonstrates that the racial classifications must
stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy."' 189 The strict scrutiny analysis that the Court applied in Loving
did not consider the meaning of marriage in either the white community or the
black community, but rather saw the injustice of the particular classification at
issue. 190 In this sense, the case began its analysis with the assumption that
marriage with a white person would have no impact on one's standing within
the African American community.
The constitutional defect of laws prohibiting interracial marriage turns
not only on their promotion of racism in the white community, but also on
shared understandings of membership that exist in white and black
communities, and indeed all racial communities in this country. Marriage is an
act that quite clearly involves positioning oneself in relation to different
communities, including one's family, one's religion, and for many Americans,
one's race. Marrying outside the black community was doubly difficult not
only because it subjected one to an unjust law, but also perhaps because it
risked making one something of a pariah for turning one's back on the rest of
the community by taking a partner who was outside of the race.
91
Because of its focus on the particular classification at issue-such as
gender, race, or disability-and the relevant level of scrutiny, U.S.
antidiscrimination law does not begin to question the punitive implications of
conceptualizing the constitutional violation from the perspective of the group
that is the victim of racism, sexism, or another form of prejudice. In U.S. law,
it seems, the social category is defined not by the group itself, but by broader
social norms. The meaning of blackness or womanhood or any category is not
relevantly situated within the group itself.
If U.S. law were to consider more carefully the forms of normative
authority exerted by these groups, certain new claims would be available
under an antisubordination principle.1 92 In a case such as Loving, the added
social and personal risk of marrying a white person when one is black-
especially in the historical context of the late 1960s-would lend added
salience to the status harm caused by the classification prohibiting interracial
marriages. 193 Indeed, the same can be said of laws requiring a member of a
racial group to avoid behaviors commonly associated with that group, or
requiring a gay person to assume behavior that would be perceived as
stereotypically straight.
188. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
189. Id. at 11.
190. Id.
191. See PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE AND
LAW-AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002).
192. See Fiss, supra note 156 (conceptualizing the relations among groups in a set of hierarchal
relationships as the relevant site of inquiry for recognizing a harm under the Equal Protection Clause).
193. See id.
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Kenji Yoshino has directed attention to the harms that result when a
person is asked to adapt to more widely shared but unspoken practices of the
majority. 194 He identifies an assimilationist bias in U.S. equal protection law:
[it] maintains that groups that can assimilate are less worthy of protection than groups
that cannot. It further suggests that the only acceptable defense to a demand for
assimilation is the inability to accede to it. In doing so, the jurisprudence reflects and
reinforces a schism between gays on the one hand and racial minorities and women on
the other.
95
Abandoning these practices and forms of expression not only risks causing a
certain harm to the group, but also risks subjecting anyone who feels
compelled to follow those laws to the permanent and perhaps even debilitating
ostracism of the group to which he or she belongs. The requirement of
assimilation is a pressure that is exerted across groups and that complicates
efforts to dismantle a status hierarchy through legal interventions to shape
social values. Yoshino's conception of the assimilationist bias points to the
ways in which U.S. law maintains subordinate groups within the polity as
somewhat detached from efforts of legal reform. Rather than protecting and
cultivating the practices that constitute these groups and seeking to thus invite
them into a dialogue about our shared commitments to equality, U.S. equality
law too often insulates these groups from such discussions. Our law treats
such groups as things to be protected, rather than alternate sites of normative
authority that are relevant to law.
Along these lines, the conception of community membership in Indian
case law is strikingly different from the conceptions of diversity that dominate
much of U.S. thinking about efforts to redress various forms of inequality.
Rather, the model of diversity that Indian case law seems most strongly to
evoke is what Heather Gerken has called "second order diversity," which
contemplates the need for different conceptions of diversity in a variety of
institutional settings.196 For a polity in the midst of a disruptive and sustained
transformation, the authority exerted by certain groups within the polity can
help to give legitimacy to the project, and through exchanges among their
members and with the broader society, can contribute to deeper and more
permanent social change. From this perspective, and because of the authority
exerted by such groups, majority-minority districts can be justified on the
grounds that they can help to articulate and reinforce certain normative
commitments. On the other end of the spectrum, a jury of one race might be
seen as more problematic, because although it has a representative dimension,
a jury serves less of a purely representative function, as it is focused on
adjudicating a particular case.107
This Note has not focused on developing a complete framework for
accounting for such understandings about the authority of caste communities
from the perspective of U.S. equality law. An investigation into the ways that
194. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, Ill YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002) ("Covering means the
underlying identity is neither altered nor hidden, but is downplayed.").
195. Id. at 779.
196. See Gerken, supra note 183, at 1104-08.
197. See id. at 1137.
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such a view of groups in our equality law might be transformed in response to
a number of problems would be too extensive to complete here. Rather, this
Note has sought to question the assumptions about the nature of the groups
protected by U.S. equality law rather than to propose that the model adopted
by the Indian courts should be adopted here, or to presume to be able to
envision what the Indian conception of groups would look like if we were to
import it and let it take root here.
When we observe that U.S. law takes seriously the ways that status
hierarchies change in response to legal norms, it then does not seem so
unlikely that there are claims of membership made by these communities that
are meaningful from the perspective of individuals and of the groups
themselves. Such conceptions of membership may be personal, such as one's
selection of a marriage partner, and include more transient aspects of our lives
which nonetheless define us, such as matters like styles of dress and speech,
and taste in popular culture. These requirements are also powerfully backed
by the authority of the group to ostracize any member who does not embrace
this set of rules. At times, recognition of the group might risk rendering such
conceptions coercive. In the end, however, by recognizing the significance of
group membership and of the authority that these groups exert over their own
members, constitutional law can also help to produce a set of understandings
that link the group to its history and to a shared experience with a process of
social reform.
The Indian Constitution's promise of greater equality for protected
communities remains largely unmet. 198 However, over many years, and
perhaps generations, it seems plausible that the Indian case will prove that its
vision of equality law has the potential to result in a form of social equality
that is more meaningful. The membership rules of the castes may begin to
change significantly on their own, and the dissonance between constitutional
principle and the potentially exclusionary and even prejudiced practices of
some castes might begin to soften.
Social reform that gains the consent of castes in Indian, or of the groups
that U.S. equality law seeks to protect, is likely in the long run to sustain a
more robust version of equality. By enabling the groups to assert group
identities and shared understandings in relation to the law, Indian law allows
them eventually to embrace the bold and transformative commitments in the
equality provisions of the Indian Constitution. It enables the constitution's
principles to be absorbed by culture. The risk is that, over time, the
interactions between traditional communities and constitutional law will result
in a dilution of the constitution's commitments.
The future of the caste system lies largely with the castes themselves.
Law has pointed the way, but it has done so in such a way that understands the
limits of law in relation to the forms of authority that exist in places that
people can live, touch, and even love. The future of Indian law depends on the
198. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDDEN APARTHEID: CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
INDIA'S UNTOUCHABLES 111-12 (1997), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11030/section/l;
NAT'L CAMPAIGN ON DALIT RIGHTS, ALTERNATE REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 5-54 (2008); Neeta Lal, UN's Caste Declaration Riles India, ASIA TIMES, Oct.
20, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SouthAsiaKJ20DfU2.htmil.
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interactions among the members of the lower castes, their communities, and
legal doctrine. It is a project that the courts have only just begun, and one that
will continue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Looking at U.S. equality law from the Indian perspective reveals that
courts do and must consider the ways that the entrenched status hierarchies in
society are transformed by the interventions of constitutional law. To be
white, or to be black, or to be a woman, or to be a gay person, involves deeply
held understandings of what membership in such a group means for that
group-understandings that are shaped by the group, the society, and by
courts themselves.
What it means to be an untouchable similarly involves conceptions of
group membership articulated by untouchables and in reference to prejudices
commonly held throughout Indian society. The deference granted to each
caste in Indian constitutional law suggests that membership in a community
within a status hierarchy may also involve certain normative commitments,
especially the subordinate group's standards for membership, that complicate
any effort to use the power of the state to address underlying social
inequalities among groups.
As the discourses of antisubordination and anticlassification values in
U.S. equal protection law reveal, these principles remain culturally rooted, and
exist in a conversation between law and culture. The comparison to Indian law
suggests, however, that antisubordination should be shaped by the perspective
of the subordinated, rather than from the lofty vantage of constitutional
principle.
Indian law suggests that U.S. equal protection jurisprudence should, in
certain contexts, be reoriented in relation to the shared understandings and
forms of collective memory fashioned by these groups. This basic tension in
Indian equality law emphasizes that the assumptions about the normative
authority of the subordinated groups in the U.S. legal system are often
profoundly obscured. The relationship between these groups and the law,
however, is part of the basic architecture of meaningful and lasting efforts to
dismantle a system of social subordination.
